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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (2006) and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in arriving at a fair and

equitable property division. The standard of review is abuse of discretion, and the trial
court's property division is entitled to a presumption of validity "absent 'manifest
injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of... discretion.'" Childs v. Childs, 967
P.2d 942, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373
(Utah 1988) (trial court's property division will stand unless there is "a misunderstanding
or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence
clearly preponderates against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to
manifest a clear abuse of discretion.").
2.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in valuing the property at issue.

The standard of review is abuse of discretion. Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 563
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("Determining and assigning values to marital property is a matter
for the trial court, and this Court will not disturb those determinations absent a showing
of clear abuse of discretion.").
3.

Whether Appellee is entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal. The standard is

whether fees were awarded to the party by the trial court and whether the party has
substantially prevailed on the major issues on appeal. Wall v. Wall, 2007 UT App 61, f
26, 157 P.3d 341 ("In divorce proceedings, when the trial court has awarded attorney fees
1
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below to the party who then prevails on the main issues on appeal, we generally award
fees on appeal.").
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) is applicable to the case on appeal, and is set forth, in
relevant part, at page eleven.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal represents the third attempt of Appellant Michael Hodge ("Husband")
to achieve a windfall in his divorce from Appellee Diane Hodge ("Wife"). The first
attempt was at the two-day trial, where Husband sought to avoid responsibility for huge
losses he imposed on the marital estate from risky stock market transactions while
obtaining a disproportionate share of the income and assets Wife obtained through her
own efforts following the parties' separation. In a detailed twenty-two page
Memorandum Decision (R. 353-374), followed by 131 separate, detailed findings of fact
(R. 437-463), the trial court carefully reviewed the voluminous documents, testimony and
other evidence presented at trial and declined to award Husband the windfall he sought.
Among the trial court's detailed findings: Husband was principally at fault "in losing
much of what the Court has found to be the marital estate," and Husband "should not
benefit to the extent he believes because the marriage 'produced' a high income party."
(R. 437, 458)
The second attempt was after trial, where Husband asked the trial court to
reconsider its ruling. (R. 404-05) Husband's post-trial motion did not challenge the trial
court's basic methodology, which was carefully crafted to allow each party to "walk
2
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away" from the marriage "in the same economic proportion as when they entered the
marriage." (R. 458) Instead, Husband sought a re-calculation based on alleged mistakes
in allocating or valuing certain of the assets - an approach that was not only inconsistent
with Husband's approach at trial, but also in complete disregard of the overall equitable
result the trial court sought to achieve through the methodology it applied. (R. 411-412)
Noting this Court's characterization of such requests to reconsider as "the cheatgrass of
the litigation landscape," Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, f 15 n.5, 100 P.3d 1151, the
trial court summarily denied Husband's post-trial motion, aptly characterizing it as
"nothing more than an attempt to have the court re-examine what it has already
examined," and awarded Wife her attorneys' fees and costs incurred in responding to the
motion. (R. 471-473)
In this third attempt, Husband once again seeks a windfall and a do-over. This
third attempt differs from both the first and the second, although the result it seeks is
equally biased in favor of Husband and equally dismissive of the important equitable
considerations the trial court expressly identified as underlying its result.1 Moreover, it is
based on an argument that, if adopted, would strip trial courts of the broad discretion this
Court has consistently granted them in fashioning a fair and equitable property division,
and impose a new rule that trial courts are mandated to follow a strictly formulaic
approach.
1

In his post-trial motion, Husband argued for a different proportional award than the trial
court ordered; now he seeks a 50/50 division. He sought a total of $254,000 in his posttrial motion, now he seeks $574,998. Husband's theories, and the bottom-line windfall
they seek to achieve, are constantly changing, but they have in common an attempt to
avoid responsibility for the losses he caused to the marital estate.
3
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The issues presented for review center on property division. There is no dispute,
as the trial court specifically found, "that each of the parties brought premarital assets
into the marriage." (R. 460) There is also no dispute that Wife brought more assets into
the marriage than Husband, and contributed more of her assets to the marital estate, while
Husband kept more of his separate. (R. 460) There is no dispute that, in the course of
just a few months, Husband lost the entire amount of Wife's contribution, some
$610,000, in on-line trading in "covered calls." (R. 449-450) Finally, there is no dispute
that the parties borrowed a total of $538,000 from Wife's sister's trust during the
marriage, but together repaid only $200,000 of that total, leaving Wife to repay $184,000
in December (R. 555 at 131), and an additional $154,000 still owing (R. 388), all without
any contribution from Husband (R. 459).
The trial court did not purport to identify, value or assign the assets and liabilities
with mathematical precision, but agreed with Husband that it was "not capable of
determining with precision the amounts that should be offset, credited, backed out, or put
in someone's column," and therefore sought a means of arriving at a fair and equitable
result that did not require "tedious calculations to which the parties could not agree." (R.
457, 460) Specifically, the trial court found that Wife contributed to the marriage the

2

Husband consistently argued at trial that the trial court should forgo detailed financial
calculations in favor of an "Equalization of Assets" as set forth on his Exhibit 146. See,
e.g., R. 566 at 538 ("Well, instead of having an accounting that's 18 pages long showing
here's what she did with this money, here's this, here's that, here's that, now put this
back in this place, we thought the easier thing would just be, frankly, to equalize, because
there's no other way to do it"); R. 566 at 545 ("Let's take this figure of $519,000, which
4
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proceeds from the sale of her pre-marital home plus additional funds "for a total of
approximately $700,000," while Husband contributed "approximately $300,000 into the
marriage," mainly from the sale of his pre-marital home. (R. 458) The trial court
acknowledged these were "round figures." (R. 458) The court then went on to note that
Husband lost virtually all of Wife's contribution through speculative and ill-advised
dabbling in complicated and risky stock market transactions, including "covered calls" in
an on-line margin account, while Husband preserved and enhanced what he brought into
the marriage or contributed by investing in IBM stock, real estate and other blue-chip
investments. (R. 458) The court expressly concluded that while the losses were marital
and both parties bore "some responsibility" for the losses, Husband's "proportion of the
fault is greater than that of [Wife] in losing the money." (R. 459)
The trial court also specifically explained its basic goal and the methodology it
adopted to achieve that goal. The trial court's stated goal was to achieve an "ultimate
result" that was "fair and equitable, given the facts and circumstances of this case." (R.
457) Husband had argued for an "Equalization of Assets," an approach that would have
required Wife to pay Husband over $500,000. See Exhibit 146.3 Wife had asked the

is the equalization of our net incomes, and just forget everything else, because frankly it's
just too complicated to fetter that out").
3

Husband sought to justify his approach by arguing he should be viewed as equivalent to
a "cstay-at-home mom' who supported the 'breadwinner' by raising the children and
allowing the breadwinner to earn income . . . . " (R. 447) The court rejected that
argument, noting (a) "the parties' standard of living did not substantially change until
2004, shortly before their October 2004 separation" (R. 445), and (b) Husband "was not
in any way responsible for [Wife's] increase in income, either from his support or from
his efforts in other areas such as raising children" (R. 447). On the contrary, the court
5
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court to restore both parties to the status quo ante based on the statute governing shortterm marriages where no children are born, an approach that would have required
Husband to reimburse Wife for his speculative stock-market losses she covered. See
Exhibit 60. The trial court did not accept either party's position; instead, it sought to
enable both parties "to leave the marriage in the same relative position economically as
when they entered the marriage." (R. 457)
The court noted that Wife contributed about 70% and Husband about 30%, i.e. that
Wife "brought approximately 2.3 times the amount [Husband] brought in." (R. 458) In
an effort to divide the parties' assets in a way that made sense and reflected in relative
terms what each party contributed to the marital estate by way of pre-marital or separate
property that was commingled, the court awarded Wife the marital home, where she has
resided with her children from a prior marriage since the parties' October 2004
separation, along with all accounts in her own name, "created largely since separation,"
for a total award of approximately $800,000. (R. 459) The court awarded Husband all of
his retirement accounts, including the substantial portion contributed and accrued during
the marriage, along with all other accounts in his own name, for a total award of
approximately $400,000. (R. 459) Because of claimed uncertainty in the value of the

found that Husband "did not like [Wife] being at work and away from him" and "in fact
encouraged [Wife] to work less" and "did not support [Wife] by attending functions with
her but instead continued his personal activities such as mountain biking and training."
(R. 447-448) In short, the trial court concluded that "the income [Wife] has achieved is
not the product of [Husband's] supportive efforts in any major part, but is largely the
product of her own effort, while raising her two children with some assistance from
[Husband]." (R. 448) Husband has now recognized his trial approach was contrary to
law and equity, and has abandoned it on appeal.
6
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retirement accounts, and because Husband "provided for the family for most of the
marriage" until Wife was forced to go back to work so she could recoup what Husband
lost in the stock market, the court ordered Wife to provide Husband an additional
$100,000, which was to come from the equity in the marital home. (R. 460) Finally, the
court made clear Wife would bear sole responsibility for repaying a marital obligation
with an outstanding balance of $154,000 borrowed from her sister and lost in Husband's
speculative investment activities, in addition to the $184,000 she had already repaid in
December 2005, also to come from her equity in the marital home. (R. 455, 460)
The trial court's division of the parties' major assets and liabilities (including the
marital home and Husband's retirement accounts and the loans from Wife's sister's trust)
achieved a result substantially less favorable to Wife than the trial court's targeted 70/30
proportional distribution. The confusing array of numbers and figures Husband presents
obscures this reality, but it is evident in the following concise summary of the trial court's
property division:

7
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1 Asset/(Liability)
Awarded
Net Equity in Marital
Home (R. 455, 459)
Automobiles (R. 455-456)
Wasatch Ice Stock (R.
456,461)
Husband's Investment/
Retirement (R. 461-462)
Husband's Cash Accounts
(R. 461)
Wife's Investment/
Retirement (R. 461-462)
Wife's Cash Accounts (R.
461)
2004 Tax Refund (R. 461)
[December 2005 Payment
to Sister's Trust (R. 555 at
131, R. 459)
Unpaid Balance on
Marital Loans from
Sister's Trust (R. 388,
460)
[Equalizing Payment (R.

Husband

Value
$783,000

Wife
$783,000

$ 53,000
$ 12,600

$31,000
$ 12,600

$375,535

$375,535

$ 94,625

$ 94,625

$ 22,000

$136,279

$136,279

$130,156

$130,156

$ 19,486
$184,000

$ 19,486
($184,000)

$154,000

($154,000)

$100,000

($100,000)

$613,760

$652,921

1460)
Total

These numbers and figures reflect Husband's own calculations or admissions of
the extent and value of the parties' assets and liabilities. Husband's calculations do not
reflect that Husband was given one-half of the tax loss carry-forwards attributable to his
speculative trading with Wife's separate-property contributions (worth as much as
$140,000 based on a 20% Long-term Capital Gains tax rate on $700,000 total stock
market losses) even though Wife alone is repaying the debts to her sister's trust and
otherwise working to recoup the losses; they do not reflect the $6,000 in temporary
8
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1

alimony Husband received during the pendency of the action, which was effectively an
additional property award since the trial court determined Husband was voluntarily
underemployed and did not need alimony; and they reflect assumptions not supported by
the evidence or endorsed by the trial court, including an inaccurate assumption that Wife
"dissipated" the marital estate by more than $40,000. All things considered, these figures
show Husband emerged from the divorce on virtually equal financial footing with Wife,
albeit not with the windfall he continues to seek.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Trial courts are given broad discretion in fashioning property divisions in divorces.
This Court's precedents make clear such discretion extends to awarding a spouse some
part of the other spouse's separate property, awarding one spouse a disproportionate
share of the marital estate, or otherwise making appropriate adjustments to achieve the
ultimate objective of a fair and equitable result given all the relevant facts and
circumstances. There is no hard-and-fast rule, as Husband argues for the first time on
appeal, requiring trial courts to follow a rigid methodology or apply a fixed formula. The
trial court's property division, supported by commendably detailed findings
demonstrating the fundamental fairness and equity of its result, is well within its
discretion and should not be disturbed on appeal. See infra Argument I.
Similarly, a trial court's factual findings as to asset valuations are presumed valid,
and ought to be revisited only when such serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion. Having consistently argued at trial the court should not bother
with detailed calculations, Husband now points to a few alleged errors. Ironically,
9
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Husband's own Addendum B contains a large mistake, since it omits to account for the
remaining $154,000 debt to Wife's sister's trust Husband admits Wife must repay from
her share of the property. Beyond errors and omissions, however, what Husband does
not and cannot show is that the end result the trial court achieved represents a serious
inequity or even a material deviation from what Husband himself says the true numbers
would show. See infra Argument II.
Finally, because husband's arguments are all at base groundless attempts to
reargue matters resting within the sound discretion of the trial court, and because the trial
court awarded Wife her attorneys' fees incurred in opposing Husband's prior attempt to
reargue those matters in his motion to reconsider, this Court should award Wife her
attorneys' fees on appeal. See infra Argument III.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO FOLLOW A RIGID
METHODOLOGY OR APPLY A MATHEMATICAL FORMULA, BUT
PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS BROAD DISCRETION IN FASHIONING A
FAIR, EQUITABLE AND PROPORTIONAL PROPERTY DIVISION
Notwithstanding abundant evidence showing Husband achieved an almost-equal

division of the parties' property, and notwithstanding detailed findings on equitable
considerations justifying an even more disproportionate distribution than actually resulted
from the trial court's efforts to achieve a fair and equitable result, Husband tries once
again, through new counsel and using a new theory, to achieve a windfall. Husband
understands this Court will not revisit fact-intensive equitable determinations well within
the trial court's broad discretion in fashioning property awards. Therefore, Husband

10
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argues the trial court erred as a matter of law by not identifying and segregating every
item of each party's separate property and then equally dividing the marital property.
Besides being raised for the first time on appeal, Husband's argument is based on an
erroneous legal premise - that trial courts must strictly follow a single rigid methodology
and apply a single mathematical formula in dividing property in a divorce. That is simply
not the law, and Husband's effort to adom an assault on the trial court's sound discretion
in the garb of legal error must fail.
As a general matter, the trial courts' statutory mandate is to enter "equitable orders
relating to the . . . property, debts and obligations" of the parties. Utah Code Ann. § 303-5(1) (2006). The Utah Supreme Court has made clear this statute confers "broad
discretion upon trial courts in the division of property, regardless of its source or time of
acquisition," and requires trial courts to exercise their discretion "in a manner which best
serves the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue their separate lives."
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 134-35 (Utah 1987). The overriding consideration is "that
the ultimate division be equitable - that property be fairly divided between the parties
given their contributions during the marriage and their circumstances at the time of
divorce." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Newmever v.
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987)). That is precisely the "ultimate result" (R.
457) the trial court sought and achieved in this case.
Husband relies on what he calls a "fast-standing rule" that the trial court must
award each party his or her premarital or separate property "unless it has been
commingled so that it has lost its separate character." See Brief of Appellant/Respondent
11
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Michael Hodge at 9, Hodge v. Hodge, Case No. 20060789 CA (Utah Ct. App. April 6,
2006) {hereinafter referred to as "Brief of Appellant"). There is no such hard and fast
rule, in Dunn or any other case.4 On the contrary, the case law makes clear that even if
the trial court identifies property as entirely separate, and even if that property has not
been commingled, the trial court can still award some or all of that property to the other
spouse, or make a disproportionate award of the marital property, or make such other
adjustments as may be necessary or appropriate to achieve a fair and equitable property
division.
In Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, 45 P.3d 176, the trial court undertook to
identify the parties' separate property, but then did not proceed unthinkingly to award
each party all of his or her separate property. Instead, the trial court considered
additional facts and circumstances bearing on the overall equities between the parties,
and concluded that equity required that the wife be given a share of the appreciation in
the husband's separate assets. IdL at ff 20, 24. The trial court made this adjustment even
though it had expressly "determined that Husband had not commingled the [separate]
partnership assets and Wife had not directly enhanced their value." Id. at f 20.
4

The holding of the Dunn case on which Husband principally relies is that "the trial court
abused its discretion when it justified an unequal and inequitable distribution of marital
property based solely on the parties' economic contributions to the marriage." Dunn v.
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1322 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added). As set forth herein,
the trial court in this case did not base its fair and equitable property division "solely on
the parties' economic contributions to the marriage," but on an array of factors, including
the parties' relative responsibility for the massive losses that Husband incurred from
speculative stock market plays with Wife's pre-marital contributions while preserving his
own premarital contributions in home equity, IBM stock and other more conservative and
secure investments. Properly construed and applied, Dunn supports the approach
followed and the conclusions reached by the trial court in this case.
12
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As does Husband here, the husband in that case argued there was no basis in law
for the trial court's approach, and relied on Dunn to argue that once the court had
identified certain of his property as separate, it was obligated to award him that property.
Id. at T| 21. This Court rejected "Husband's assertion that the trial court's award is entirely
without support in our case law," stating:
[S]eparate property is not "totally beyond [a] court's reach in an
equitable property division." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). The court may award the separate property
of one spouse to the other spouse in "'extraordinary situations where
equity so demands.'" Id; see also Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d
260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("Exceptions to this general rule
include whether ... the distribution achieves a fair, just, and equitable
result.").
Id. at TflJ 19, 30. This Court flatly rejected the very same crimped, narrow reading of
Dunn on which Husband relies here, stating "the trial court appropriately relied on our
reasoning in Dunn. Id. at f 22 (emphasis added).
Thus Utah case law is clear that, while the trial court may start out by
"categorizing] the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the separate
property of one or the other," and while "[e]ach party is presumed to be entitled to all of
his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property," that is far from a
mandatory, one-size-fits-all formula; trial courts are expressly required to "consider the
existence of exceptional circumstances" rather than blindly following some rigid
methodology and strictly applying some one-size-fits-all formula. Burt, 799 P.2d at
1172.

13
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It is noteworthy that Husband consistently argued the trial court should not bother
making detailed calculations with mathematical precision, and in fact repeatedly argued it
was "too complicated" to do so. See supra n. 2. In other words, Husband now seeks
reversal on the ground the trial court did not adopt a mindset he repeatedly urged the trial
court not to adopt. Because Husband raises his new theory for the first time on this
appeal, it should be rejected for that reason alone. State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, f 17, 4
P.3d 795 (unless plain error or exceptional circumstances exist - and neither has been
shown here - this court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal because
"it is unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule correctly on an issue it was never
given the opportunity to consider."). In any event, the trial court did its best to identify
the parties' separate property, and did its best to distinguish between separate property
that was commingled and lost its separate identity and separate property that had
remained separate. (R. 457-58) To the extent Husband argues otherwise, that argument
is both unfair to the trial court and inconsistent with the record.
Having done its best to identify the parties' separate property, the trial court then
proceeded to the more difficult question, with which it admittedly "struggled" (R. 457):
how to achieve the ultimate objective of a fair and equitable property division in light of
what the parties brought to the marriage, how they conducted themselves throughout the
marriage, how they faced their separate futures as a result, and the other relevant facts
and circumstances that inevitably bear on such equitable determinations. It simply
cannot be said that in struggling to answer that question the trial court failed to make
"commendably detailed" findings of "exceptional circumstances" that fully justify the
14
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proportional result the trial court achieved here as fair and equitable.5 Those findings
include the following:
•

Wife has two minor children from a prior marriage (R. 440)

•

Husband is an experienced airline pilot who has chosen to "work less" so
that he can balance work with activities he enjoys (R. 442-443)

•

Husband is capable of meeting his own reasonable needs (R. 443)

•

Husband could choose to fly more or otherwise supplement his income
from secondary sources such as pursuing his latest interest in selling real
estate (R. 443)

•

In an ill-conceived effort to make money in the stock market (apparently as
part of his choice to "work less"), Husband placed the proceeds from the
sale of Wife's pre-marital home in an Ameritrade account and traded in
speculative "covered calls" with those funds, while "he opted to invest his
premarital funds by paying down the mortgage on the parties' home" (R.
449-450)

5

Husband insists "the trial court in this case made no findings of exceptional
circumstances." Brief of Appellant at 13, 14. The only sense in which this statement
could conceivably be true is the trial court did not use those specific words. There is no
requirement that "magic words" be used. Husband then backtracks, and says "the trial
court failed to make 'commendably detailed findings' regarding its conclusion." Brief of
Appellant at 15. The half-page argument devoted to this statement reflects an attempt to
reduce all the trial court's numerous findings detailing the conduct that brought about the
huge losses Husband incurred and their impact on the parties' relative contributions to the
marriage to a single conclusion that both parties stand on equal equitable footing - a
conclusion the findings and the evidence simply do not support.
15
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•

Husband's speculative on-line trading resulted in the loss of all of Wife's
money in the stock market, including funds borrowed from the trust of
Wife's disabled sister Susan (R. 449-451, 453)

•

Husband "begged [Wife's] forgiveness for losing her money, and made a
commitment to repay the sums, acknowledging all blame and responsibility
for losing the money" (R. 451)

•

After Husband lost all of Wife's separate funds in risky on-line margin
trades and Wife was forced to re-enter the workforce, Husband did not
support Wife's efforts to pursue a career in real estate, and those efforts
came to fruition only after the parties' separation (R. 445-448)

•

While "the losses in the stock market were marital, [Husband] bears the
primary burden and responsibility." (R. 462)

•

The court could not "calculate any formula or precise figure that should be
attributable to [Husband] concerning the loss, but does find his proportion
of the fault is greater than that of [Wife] in losing the money (R. 459)

•

Notwithstanding Husband's admission of responsibility and promise to
repay the money, Wife alone repaid her sister's trust $184,000 in December
2005 without any contribution from Husband (R. 459)

•

There is a total amount still owing to Wife's sister's trust of $154,000 (R.
388), and Wife "will be responsible for repaying that loan" (R. 460)

The above facts, and many more set forth in the trial court's detailed
Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact, have a direct bearing on the ultimate
16
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equitable considerations that govern property division, and they fully support the trial
court's basic decision to make a disproportionate property division in this case. In the
typical case, including Dunn and others cited above, one spouse is awarded a share of the
other spouse's separate property and/or a disproportionate share of the marital property
because he or she contributed in some distinct fashion to enhancing the value of the
other's separate property. This case represents the opposite. The only unique
"contribution" Husband made in this case was to stake Wife's and her sister's money on
risky, ill-advised on-line trading schemes. After creating devastating losses to the marital
estate and requiring Wife to do everything she could to recoup the losses, Husband
essentially sought to become another dependent for Wife to support, in addition to her
children and disabled sister. (R. 556, at 529-530) The trial court declined to give Wife
another dependent. The trial court also declined to place the parties in equivalent
positions, since Husband himself had not done so in his choices as to how to manage his
own pre-marital assets versus how he managed Wife's. Bottom line: "The Court finds of
the approximate $700,000 [Wife] brought into the marriage, $600,000 was lost. The
Court also finds that none of Respondent's original property, pre-marital and later
commingled, was lost." (R. 458)
In light of this fundamental equitable conclusion, well supported by
"commendably detailed" findings, Husband's argument that the trial court erred because
the property division it fashioned was proportional rather than strictly equal, must fail.
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II.

TO THE EXTENT THE TRIAL COURT RELIED ON APPROXIMATIONS
IN ITS PROPERTY VALUATIONS, NO SERIOUS INEQUITY HAS
RESULTED
Husband's remaining argument is a direct attack on the trial court's factual

determinations, specifically its calculations of the parties' relative contributions to the
marital estate. In attacking the trial court's factual determinations, Husband is required to
lay out all the findings that would support its decision not to divide the marital estate
exactly in half, and to marshal the evidence in support of those findings. Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 76, 100 P.3d 1177 ("In order to challenge a court's factual
findings, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below.") (emphasis added)
(quotations and citation omitted); see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging
a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding."). Husband fails to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's findings,
consistently mixes apples and oranges, and fails to fairly and accurately describe what the
trial court did. Properly understood, the trial court's calculations were materially
accurate, and any minor discrepancies based on approximations do not amount to the
kind of serious inequity required to disturb the trial court's overall equitable result.
Husband first argues the trial court "miscalculated" both Wife's and Husband's
relative contributions to the marital estate because the trial court did not include all of the
parties' separate property, including property they agreed was separate. Brief of
Appellant at 17-18. Ironically, Husband himself is guilty of a gross miscalculation,
18
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because his Addendum B omits entirely the $154,000 outstanding debt to Wife's sister's
trust Husband admits Wife must pay from her share of the property division, and
understates the amount of the repayment Wife made to her sister's trust in December
2005, after the parties' separation, by some $30,000. (Id. at 6-7), acknowledging Wife
repaid her sister's trust $184,000 in December 2005, and acknowledging the additional
debt of $154,000 that has yet to be repaid to the trust).
Beyond Husband's own errors and omissions, it is true that the trial court did not
include all the parties' separate property in its calculations, but that is because the court's
approach was to identify what each party contributed to the marriage through
commingling, not what each party had going in to the marriage, including what it
maintained as separate. In other words, Husband attacks the trial court for not including
items the trial court excluded as not directly relevant to the overall fair and equitable
result it sought to achieve.
The fact is that Wife contributed to the marriage "approximately" $700,000, as the
trial court found. Wife's contribution comprised all of the proceeds she received from
the sale of her separate Lucky John home, and all of the balance in her trust. Using
Husband's figures, those amounts totaled $674,000 ($627,000 in proceeds from the sale
of her home, and an additional $47,000 held in her personal trust). Brief of Appellant 17.
Husband's contention that the amount of Wife's contribution should not include the
$184,000 borrowed from her sister's trust and included within the $627,000 figure
ignores the fact that this amount was contributed to the marriage by way of the initial
deposit to the Ameritrade account - all of which was lost by Husband's speculative on19
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line trading activities - and all of which was repaid by Wife without any participation by
Husband. Therefore, the trial court's estimate is substantially correct, and as Husband
himself concedes in his brief (Brief of Appellant at 6-7), the evidence supports it.
The fact is also that Husband contributed approximately $300,000, not the
$422,187 he claims. His contributions were limited, as the trial court found, to
approximately $255,000 from the sale of his separate Jeremy Ranch home, plus
"premarital money, which was all co-mingled." (R. 456) Again, though Husband fails to
marshal it, there is substantial evidence to support that finding, summarized in the trial
court's findings (R. 454, 458) and admitted in Husband's own filings (Brief of Appellant
at 5). The fact that Husband had other funds going in to the marriage, but never
commingled or otherwise contributed them to the marriage, is irrelevant for the purpose
of assaying the reasonableness, fairness and equity of the trial court's ultimate resolution,
which was based not on what both parties had but on what was contributed.
Husband next argues, in a similar vein, that even accepting the trial court's
methodology of awarding each party a proportionate share of the property the court could
identify as having been contributed to the marriage, Wife walks away with a
disproportionately higher share, and Husband a disproportionately lower share, than the
trial court's 2.3 proportional target. Brief of Appellant at 20-22. That is simply not true.
Notwithstanding its 2.3 target, the trial court ended up awarding Wife only slightly
more than she contributed to the marriage - approximately $800,000 - while awarding
Husband substantially more than he in fact contributed to the marriage - his $375,000
Delta retirement, $30,000 in cash and an additional $100,000 payment from wife, a total
20
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of $505,000. The trial court justified modifying its putative 2.3 ratio in Husband's favor
based on claimed uncertainty in the Delta retirement and other equitable considerations.
If the trial court had strictly applied its putative 2.3 ratio to its own figures, then it would
have awarded Husband only about $347,000 ($800,000 / 2.3). Instead, Husband got
$505,000, an amount that includes a substantial cushion for any future uncertainty with
his Delta retirement.
Apparently recognizing that what the trial court actually did was more favorable to
him than perhaps intended, Husband argues the totality of what each party walks away
with must be considered, including pre-marital and post-separation property that was
never commingled. Using Husband's own figures, however, Wife's total award is
$843,572.60. Brief of Appellant at 21: "Wife will actually leave the marriage with
$843,572.60," net of the $154,000 repayment to her sister's trust and the $100,000
equitable transfer payment to Husband). That total is only about 5% more than the trial
court's approximation of $800,000, and therefore cannot be said to demonstrate the kind
of gross and unfair disparity necessary to overturn the trial court's findings. More to the
point, applying the trial court's equitable 2.3 ratio to that number would have left
husband with $366,521 ($843,572 / 2.3). But as Husband neatly summarizes, "including
the $100,000 equalizing payment from Wife, Husband was awarded $583,838" (Brief of
Appellant at 21) - a sum that reflects a ratio of about 1.46 to 1, more than one-third above
the trial court's target equitable ratio, and nowhere close to the kind of gross and
inequitable outcome that would justify this Court's disturbing the trial court's ultimate
resolution.
21
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In short, all the claimed "errors" Husband can point to don't amount to any
inequity at all, let alone a serious inequity, because no matter how much one might
struggle with (as the trial court did) or manipulate (as Husband does) the numbers and
figures, the bottom line is Husband is substantially enriched by a marriage to which he
contributed no more than he had to and from which he drained a small fortune in illadvised speculative on-line trading, requiring Wife to return to work to recoup the losses
and support herself, her children and her disabled sister. Since Husband's challenge to
the trial court's calculations is purely factual, he must show "such a serious inequity has
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Noble, 761 P.2d at 1373. Husband
simply cannot make that showing, and it borders on the frivolous for him to maintain the
trial court's ultimate conclusion is beyond the bounds of its discretion.
III.

WIFE SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED
ON APPEAL
This Court has consistently ruled that where a party has been awarded attorneys'

fees below, and she substantially prevails on appeal, she should be awarded her
attorneys' fees on appeal. Wall v. Wall 2007 UT App 61, f 26, 157 P.3d 341. In this
case, the trial court initially declined to award either party attorneys' fees, finding that
"each of the parties is fully capable of paying their own attorney fees." (R. 463) On
Husband's post-trial motion, however, the Court did not hesitate to censure Husband for
what it characterized as "nothing more than an attempt to have the court re-examine what
it has already examined." (R. 472-473) Thus, the trial court did award Wife her
attorneys' fees incurred in responding to that motion.
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Once again, Husband seeks a re-review of the trial court's findings on disputed
evidence, facts and figures. This Court has consistently held that where a party "simply
reasserts the evidence [he] presented to the district court and asks this court to reconsider
the validity of that evidence," that is "nothing but an attempt to have this [c]ourt
substitute its judgment for that of the [district] court on a contested factual issue,"
something this court "cannot do." Sweet v. Sweet 2006 UT App 216,17, 138 P.3d 63
(quoting Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App. 380, f 28, 80P.3d 553, (quotations and citation
omitted)).
Based on this Court's precedents, and given this is Husband's third attempt to
achieve a windfall and a do-over on a decision that he simply fails to recognize as being
more favorable than he deserved, Wife respectfully requests that this Court remand this
case to the trial court for a determination of an appropriate amount of attorneys' fees to
be awarded.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Wife respectfully asks that this Court affirm the trial
court's property division as well within the substantial discretion granted to the trier of
fact in fashioning a fair and equitable property division, and award her attorneys' fees
incurred on appeal.
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